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Abolishing Ius Sanguinis Citizenship:
A Proposal Too Restrained and Too Radical
Kristin Collins
Costica Dumbrava maintains that ius sanguinis citizenship is a historically
tainted, outmoded, and unnecessary means of designating political membership. He argues that it is time to abandon it. His proposal is bold, and it has
significant implications for an array of policies and practices. The parent-
child relationship not only serves as a basis for citizenship transmission; it
also entitles individuals to immigration preferences, and – in some countries – it facilitates automatic or ‘derivative’ naturalisation of the children of
naturalised parents. In many countries that recognise ius soli citizenship, the
parent-child relationship serves as an added requirement: one must be born
in the sovereign territory and be the child of a citizen or a long-term legal
resident. Dumbrava limits his challenge to ius sanguinis citizenship per se,
and even suggests that family-based migration rights could be used to minimise the disruptive effect of abolishing citizenship-by-descent. But his core
complaints about ius sanguinis citizenship – the mismatch of biological parentage and political affinity, the difficulties of determining legal parentage –
can be, and have been, levied against these various family-based preferences
and statuses, which are likely found in every nation’s nationality laws. It is
therefore important to consider his proposal in light of the role that the
parent-child relationship plays in the regulation of migration, naturalisation,
and citizenship more generally. With this broader context in mind, I concur
with Rainer Bauböck and Jannis Panagiotidis that Dumbrava’s proposal
rests on an under-informed assessment of the historical record. I also argue
that that, as a remedy for the problems that he has identified, Dumbrava’s
proposal is at once too restrained and too radical.

The complex history of ius sanguinis citizenship
Dumbrava first argues that ius sanguinis citizenship should be abolished
because, historically, it has been associated with ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship. I appreciate Panagiotidis’ insistence that ‘the problem is
not with ius sanguinis itself, but with the respective contexts in which it is
embedded’. Panagiotidis also reminds us that ius sanguinis citizenship has
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sometimes functioned to create political communities that draw from different ethnic and religious groups, as in the case of German Jews whose membership in the German polity was secured by the country’s ius sanguinis
laws prior to the Nazi era. I want to elaborate and underscore the importance
of this point with an additional example from United States history: During
seventy years of Chinese exclusionary laws, ius sanguinis citizenship provided one of the very few routes to entry, and to American citizenship, for
ethnic Chinese individuals born outside the U.S. For precisely that reason,
exclusionists sought to limit or repeal the ius sanguinis statute, which recognised the foreign-born children of American fathers as citizens.1 If one
expands the historical frame to include parent-child immigration preferences and derivative naturalisation, the story becomes even more complex.
By 1965, the race-based exclusions and national-origins quotas had been
abolished, and previously excluded Asian families began immigrating to the
U.S. in unprecedented numbers.2 They were able to do so by relying on the
generous family-based preferences in American immigration and nationality laws, which facilitated entry, settlement, and – especially significant to
this discussion – derivative naturalisation for children.3
Even a cursory review of the historical record thus counsels a cautionary
assessment of the contention that ius sanguinis citizenship’s tainted past justifies its abolition. First, calls to end ius sanguinis citizenship have their own
ugly history. Second, although one cannot gainsay that, in certain circumstances, ius sanguinis citizenship has been used to maintain ethnic homogeneity, the notion that parents and children do and should share the same
political affiliation has also facilitated racial, ethnic, and religious diversification of some political communities. Rather than abolish ius sanguinis citizenship wholesale, we should be alert to the ways that it can operate as a tool
1

2

3

For a discussion of these laws and efforts to restrict the recognition of ethnic
Chinese individuals under the ius sanguinis citizenship statute, see Collins,
K.A. (2014), ‘Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation’, Yale Law Journal 123 (7) 2134–
2235 (at 2170–2182). Starting in 1934, the ius sanguinis statute also allowed
American mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. See id.
at 2157.
See Reimers, D. (1983), ‘An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act
and Third World Immigration to the United States’, Journal of American
Ethnic History 9 (3): 23–24; Ong Hing, B. (1999), Making and Remaking
Asian America Through Immigration Policy, 1850–1900. Stanford: SUP,
81–120.
See, for example, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 245,
§ 323.
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of ethnic exclusion and degradation in particular socio-legal contexts, and
work to minimise those effects.4

A proposal too restrained and too radical
To be fair, Dumbrava does not extend his proposal to migration and naturalisation policies that enlist the parent-child relationship; indeed, he would
preserve such migration policies. He speaks only of traditional ius sanguinis
citizenship, and argues that it often fails to map on to the reality of modern
family formation, making it inadequate to ‘deal with contemporary issues
such as advances in assisted reproduction technologies’ (ART), same-sex
coupling and marriage, and the steady rise of nonmarital procreation. The
problems Dumbrava identifies in this regard are important and difficult. But
as a remedy for these problems, abolishing parent-child citizenship transmission is simultaneously too restrained and too radical. It is too restrained
because, after abandoning ius sanguinis citizenship we would still be confronted with the difficulty of determining which parent-child relationships
should count for purposes of regulating migration, derivative naturalisation,
and (in many countries) ius soli birthright citizenship. Moreover, in all of
these contexts, the ‘fundamental normative questions about who should be
a citizen in a political community’ – and about the role that the parent-child
relationship should play in that determination – would persist.
At the same time, Dumbrava’s proposal is too radical. He argues that ius
sanguinis citizenship is not necessary to protect children from statelessness
and ‘adds little to the legal and normative character of the parent-child relationship’. On this point I agree entirely with Bauböck and Scott Titshaw that
Dumbrava underestimates the disruptive potential of his proposal. If all
countries recognised unrestricted ius soli citizenship, Dumbrava’s assertion
that ius sanguinis citizenship is unnecessary to prevent statelessness would
be basically correct. But, in fact, very few ius soli countries go that far.
Instead, as noted, they use ius sanguinis concepts to restrict the operation of
ius soli birthright citizenship, thus leaving some children at a risk of statelessness if traditional ius sanguinis citizenship were abolished. And it is not
just formal statelessness that would increase in a world without ius sanguinis citizenship. Children whose citizenship does not align with that of their
4

A particularly notable example of how ius sanguinis principles can operate as
tools of ethno-racial exclusion is the 2013 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal
of the Dominican Republic, TC/0168/13, which effectively expatriated
ethnic-Haitian individuals born and residing in the D.R., leaving hundreds of
thousands of people stateless.
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parents can find themselves divided by nationality from the individuals who
are charged, ethically and legally, with their care. As Bauböck and Titshaw
observe, in an era of voluntary and compelled migration, ius sanguinis is the
most effective method of protecting against such destabilising and precarious circumstances.

How to modernise?
I agree with Titshaw and Bauböck that the modernisation of ius sanguinis
citizenship, rather than its complete repudiation, offers a better way to
address the problems Dumbrava identifies. The difficult question is how? I
am hesitant to embrace Titshaw’s proposed method of modernisation, and I
offer a friendly but important amendment to Bauböck’s proposal.
Titshaw argues that the officials who administer citizenship law should
adhere to the parentage determinations made by officials who generally
administer family law. In the U.S., these are state-level family law judges
applying state law. But domestic family law, in the U.S. and elsewhere, does
not necessarily generate ideal or even tolerable outcomes on questions of
citizenship. Titshaw holds up a particularly poorly drawn U.S. federal policy
that regulates ius sanguinis citizenship as it applies to foreign-born children
conceived using ART, but there are many examples of how the use of state
family law to regulate citizenship transmission has generated equally objectionable outcomes. 5
Alternatively, Bauböck would have us adopt a ‘ius filiationis’ standard
that recognises the ‘social parent’ or the ‘primary caregiver’ as the parent for
purposes of ius sanguinis citizenship. He urges that this would help remedy
the ‘mismatch between biologically determined citizenship and parental
care arrangements that would also open the door to abusive claims’. He is
correct. My concern, however, is that his emphasis on ‘social parenting’ and
‘primary caregiving’ is insufficient and has its own perils. First, it could
5

For example, in 1940 the federal ius sanguinis citizenship statute was amended
to include the nonmarital children of U.S. citizen fathers under certain circumstances, such as when the father had ‘legitimated’ the child. Federal officials
turned to the law of the father’s domiciliary state to determine whether
legitimation had, in fact, occurred. In the 1940s and 50s, marriage to the
child’s mother was a very common mode of legitimation, but federal officials
making citizenship determinations would not recognise an interracial marriage
as the basis of a child’s citizenship claim if the father’s home state banned such
marriages – and many did. See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n. 2, at
2210.
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increase the likelihood of abusive denials of citizenship by officials who, at
least in the U.S., are often all too eager to find reasons to reject claims to citizenship.6 In the case of nonmarital children – who make up a far greater
portion of the global population than children conceived through ART – the
restriction of parent-child citizenship transmission to ‘primary caregivers’
could lead to circumspect treatment, or outright rejection, of the father-child
relationship as a basis for citizenship transmission. Indeed, the primary
caregiver standard could stymie the caregiving efforts of unmarried fathers
who are divided by nationality from their children, and hence may never be
able to establish themselves as the ‘primary caregiver’. The emphasis on
caregiving as a prerequisite could also aid unmarried fathers who prefer to
avoid parental responsibility by distancing themselves geographically from
their children. The result: a ius sanguinis citizenship regime that would buttress gender inequality by undermining men’s parental rights and helping
them to avoid their parental responsibilities.7 Moreover, and regardless of
one’s view of the equities as between parents, it is ultimately the nonmarital
child’s citizenship and migration rights that could be destabilised, depending on how officials understood the concept of ‘social parent’. Dumbrava
recognises the inequities associated with ‘the differential treatment of children born within and out of wedlock with respect to access to citizenship’,
but his solution – to abolish parent-child citizenship transmission altogether – would give cold comfort to nonmarital children and marital children alike.
This is not an endorsement for a purely genetic model of citizenship
transmission. Despite the references to ‘blood’, ius sanguinis citizenship has
never rested on purely biological conceptions of citizenship. Traditionally,
marriage was fundamental to the ability of fathers to secure citizenship for
their children, and – at least in the development of U.S. law – the presumption that the mother is the sole caregiver of the nonmarital child led to the
recognition of the mother-child relationship as a source of citizenship for
foreign-born nonmarital children.8 Rather, I suggest that – unless and until
we move beyond citizenship as the enforcement mechanism for basic human
rights, and beyond the family as a foundational source of material and psychological support for children, we cannot overstate the importance of
6
7

8

See, for example, Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2013).
I develop this argument in: Collins, K.A. (2000), ‘When Fathers’ Rights Were
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright’, Yale
Law Journal (109) 1669–1708 (1699–1705), and in ‘Illegitimate Borders’,
above n. 2, at 2230–34.
See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n. 2, at 2199–2205.
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the generous recognition of the parent-child relationship for citizenship
transmission. The modernisation of ius sanguinis citizenship should thus
include the recognition of ‘social parents’ and parents with ‘custodial
rights’– as Bauböck rightly asserts – and also recognition of all who can be
held legally responsible for a child’s care or support. Dumbrava may be
unhappy that the whims of parents, people’s reproductive choices, and factors beyond the control of the individual would continue to determine membership in a political community. But it is precisely because citizenship
designations rest on factors such as these that I wholly agree with his admonition that we channel our efforts ‘towards consolidating democratic institution and promoting citizenship attitudes and skills among all those who find
themselves, by whatever ways and for whatever reason, in our political
community’.
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